This paper examines a specific tension emerged between the aspiration for transformation and inclusion set out in the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS) and one of the most popular conflict resolution theory and practice: consociational peace settlements. Despite the diffusion of power-sharing solutions, the gendered implications of consociationalism remain a relatively unexplored area of inquiry within the extensive body of literature on Women, Peace and Security.
have begun to delve into consociationalism's 'darker' outcomes for women. 2 This literature points out that by entrenching conservative ethnonationalist discourses, power-sharing peace settlements often also implicitly cement patriarchal values. By reifying the divisions they seek to overcome, consociational settlements essentially work to restrict the political space for introducing other interests and agendas, such as WPS. Given the extensive deployment and persistence of these institutional arrangements in many post-conflict contexts, Christine Bell argues for a more systematic analysis that foregrounds women's experiences of/in power-sharing settlements. 3 As Siobhan Byrne and Allison
McCulloch illustrate, while the tension between women's political participation and consociational power-sharing might be resolved in theory, in practice the gendered implications of power-sharing pacts are much more resilient. 4 Gathering empirical evidence into the specifics of consociational settings, thus, spotlights ways in which women and gender activists navigate these structures. feminists, civil society activists, academics, individuals working in cultural production and the media, as well some members of political parties and officials in (local and international) gender machinery institutions, based in Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka. 6 Given my interest in gauging broader dynamics beyond the strictly institutional domain, other methods included observation and participation at cultural events, meetings and conferences organised by activists. 7 With a few notable exceptions, most interviews reflect experiences at the grassroots level or in the more formalised NGO sector. In 2016, I
conducted further research and interviews with a view of assessing developments and challenges for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda 8 . This offered additional insights into various local/international efforts to navigate Dayton's counter-effects.
The post-Dayton scenario raises critical questions about the possibilities of meaningfully integrating the WPS agenda into its consociational architecture, political culture and the divisions it has sustained over the decades. More specifically I argue that undercutting WPS transformative prospects is the intersection between dysfunctions associated with corporate consociationalism, the resulting entrenchment of ethno-nationalism in political life, and the implicit proliferation of its attendant gender rhetoric. In this context, the divisive nature of ethno-national politics inevitably takes centre stage.
Gender concerns are often relegated to the margins of dominant political agenda and held hostage of what I define an 'ethno-national straightjacket". Alternatively, they get caught up in slow-decision making, political deadlock and unaccountability which, perversely, the consociational provisions have enabled. While it is possible to identify a range of actors who attempt to circumnavigate these constraints, the ability of WPS to advance the status of women and reshape the meaning of Dayton's peace and security has been inevitably limited. New strategic partnerships within and beyond the local political context might offer opportunities for transformation. I suggest that this potential also depends on a collective effort to ensure that Bosnia-Herzegovina's incomplete peace remains a priority in research, activist and policymaking agendas.
The next section outlines key gendered features of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and the efforts to address these tensions in its implementation. Then, drawing on interview data and observations, I
discuss long-standing gendered ramifications and the implications these hold for women's status and agency in the post-Dayton order. Finally, I examine the critical and generative potential of sustained activism in challenging "post-conflict/post-Dayton" gendered exclusions.
The Dayton Peace Settlement: from Gender Blindness to Rhetorical Commitment.
Despite the complex gender dynamics highlighted in the emergence of nationalism and the successive years of conflict, the peace negotiations failed to include gender as a key dimension for addressing the legacy of the Bosnian war and building sustainable peace. 9 This is unsurprising given that, from the onset of negotiations, the Dayton peace process was a politico-military process with a key aim of putting an end to the war. Indisputably the agreement was successful insofar as it stopped the atrocities and offered a settlement for the warring parties. However, despite an impressive annex of human rights mechanisms, the final document of the DPA failed to specifically address the varied impact of conflict on men and women, to include specific measures to tackle the gender dynamics underpinning war and peace and ensure women's participation as co-architects of the peace process. 10 Since the signing of the Agreement, lobbying from local and international women's groups led to the creation of a multi-level institutional gender mechanism, the adoption of the Law on Gender Equality seen an improved implementation and monitoring mechanisms that revolves around a re-orientation of the agenda following the pillars of Equal Participation, Prevention and Protection. 14 . As Ankica Tomić notes, this led to the inclusion of clearer objectives and expected results, and a more focused and efficient monitoring system. 15 Reflecting international developments and trends in the local diffusion and translation of the agenda, the formulation of the second NAP raises ambivalent expectations about its impact. 16 On the one hand, the NAP relies on a compromised programme of reform that focuses predominantly on women's inclusion in institutions and the security sector. One the other, it includes provisions that might positively draw in local authorities to carry out WPS project at the micro-political level. However, whether there is political will to take the transformative ethos of WPS seriously remains an issue. The consociational formula has laid the foundations for long-term political paralysis and enabled the local elites to mobilise ethnonationalist rhetoric to stay in power with significant gendered effects.
Dayton at 20+: Gendered Reverberations within and beyond the political structures.
Obstacles to the full implementation of WPS commitments have been experienced globally to a greater or lesser extent. 17 In the context of BIH, I suggest that these challenges are intensified by the dysfunctional "afterlives" of corporate consociationalism and the resulting entrenchment in political life of ethno-nationalism and its attendant gender rhetoric. The Agreement produced a complex multitiered system made of state level institutions, two separate entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Croat-Bosniak Federation, made up of ten cantons, and the internationally supervised Brčko district.
Following the corporate formula, group representation has been ascribed a priori on the grounds of ethnic affiliation. This principle is enshrined in the Constitution where Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs figure as The Three Constituent People, and the category of "the Others" is essentially disenfranchised from political representation. 18 The agreement's corporate nature has worked to entrench ethnic divisions in the post-conflict structures, as well as in political, social and cultural life. While the peace settlement might have been successful in creating shared institutions and mitigating violence, it has also laid the foundation for political paralysis and restricted the political space to ethnonational disputes.
This has come at the price of marginalising gender concerns in favour of dominant ethnic affiliation and nationalist politics as all-encompassing dimension of citizenship, peace and security.
All rhetoric to the contrary, international actors have also contributed to the dysfunctional afterlives of the agreement. 19 EU emphasis on stability, for example, has worked to further legitimise the modus operandi of ethnonationalist elites. The accession process set in motion a protracted kafkaesque scenario, wherein many of the parties tasked with implementing reforms to successfully join the EU are indeed the very political elites benefiting from Dayton's regime of permanent crisis. 20 In 2013 this approach had important gendered implications. During EU-led talks on constitutional reform and accountability, local women's NGOs and individual activists lobbied for the inclusion of gender discrimination among the issues to be renegotiated. They also issued demands for a more transparent and participatory process as 'the basis for establishing a truly functional and democratic society'. 21 Not only were demands largely neglected with negotiations continuing behind closed doors, but in the name of stability the EU also implicitly re-confirmed the legitimacy of ethnonational elites as the key political interlocutors for deciding the course of peace.
Dayton's afterlives might explain why, despite an impressive mechanism for gender equality and two consecutive WPS Action Plans, commitment has been rhetorical at best and success in implementation minimal. Two decades after the ratification of the peace agreement, the corporate consociational settlement has mutated into an apparatus that is dysfunctional, unresponsive and removed from everyday politics. 22 The group right provisions established through the agreement have been conducive to prolonged political deadlock and slow decision-making. Furthermore, through predetermined group representation and protection mechanism, the DPA's corporate system has offered lucrative opportunities for ethnonationalist elites to remain in power without incentives to alter their rhetoric. 23 Not only has this allowed elites to dominate the political process for their own gains, but policy and decision-making have neglected basic issues and citizens' rights, such as education, health and employment. 
Dayton and the Nationalist Politics of Gender
Notwithstanding that the Law on Gender Equality has provided strong legal foundations for women's political participation and that women's presence in elected office has improved from the early 1990s, intersecting forces undermine women's political participation and citizenship. These include a rhetorical commitment to gender equality, the entrenchment of a traditional gender order supported by national political parties, as well as Dayton's restrictive terrain of politics. In a forerunning analysis of BiH gender politics and activism, Elissa Helms illustrates how since the aftermath of the war, many women activists saw politics as an activity associated with male power, lack of transparency and corruption. 26 While BiH citizens have increasingly expressed disillusionment with politics and the nationalist elites, the subtext often implied is that politics is an unsuitable space/activity for women.
Helms points out how this connotation reproduces problematic gender tropes of women's purity/innocence vs. the male domain of corrupted politics. 27 In turn, this logic reinforces gendered exclusions in political participation, as well as pressures for the (few) women who enter politics to reassert their traditional roles. "We had a bloody war here in BiH and this is something which defines all our activities. You know that we, the nations and the people do not have trust in each other. People are frightened that somebody else could take their rights, including the rights to make decisions. The main issue is what the three main Nations that live here will do to make the country in which they live, how the country will look like and how will they create the country. [...]Bosniak people, because they are majority, believe that they have the possibility to overcome the other two nations. According to the Serbs, BiH in the way which was created by Dayton peace agreement should be unquestionable and so Republika Srpska is unquestionable because it was created according to Dayton. The Croats which live in the federation together with Bosniak people are not happy and also ask for their issue to be solved. So, once you know all these facts you can see that the issue of women is not the most important one. The most important issue is can we live together? 33 This tension still rings true today and suggests that broader changes outside the strictly legal and institutional domain are difficult to achieve, particularly when these would undermine the primacy of ethnonational interests that consociationalism has implicitly enshrined in political life. For instance, a local gender expert whom I interviewed reported that nationalist elites continue to rely on a rhetoric that reduces women's role to motherhood and narrowly defines the acceptable parameters of women's behaviour.
"I think that the whole concept of feminism within the political nationalist ideological project is even more difficult because even social-democrats think that feminists are witches. It is a general popular belief that feminist is really not something that you want to be, apart from among the feminists. The nationalist parties are trying to do their best to mask their misogyny and male chauvinism by supporting {..} social welfare programmes, you know, and constantly around the role of women as a mother.
These ideological projects are also making a huge pressure on women on how they should behave in order to respond to the role of a good Bosnian woman, good Croatian woman or good Serbian woman. There are a list of things that you have to do to be a good Serbian, etc. woman and I think that this is making a huge pressure on women, and huge expectations on how they should behave" and often intimidate women and feminists who dare to openly critique the correlations between the current status-quo, the nationalist grip on power and the gender inequalities underlying nationalist politics. For instance, an interviewee working in the Federation broadcasting service, described how in 2010 she became the target of a media campaign that, she argued, was connected to her dismissal from her position in the Federation TV 36 . There are reasons to believe that the journalist, who is renowned for her media inquests into episodes of corruption involving nationalist elites, became a target of harassment for her outspoken anti-nationalist stance. In a more recent controversy, president of Republika Srpska, Mirolad Dodik, publicly attacked Oslobodienje journalist Gordana Katana on the grounds of her gender and ethnicity. She dared to ask Dodik to comment on a series of accusations for illicit activities against a relative.
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Similarly, a local activist within a LGBTQ organisation recounted having experienced various forms of harassment and threats from sympathisers of nationalist parties because of their identity and politics as
LGBTQ collective and their work against enforced ethnonationalist rhetoric. 38 
Navigating Dayton's Afterlives through Gender Activism
The dynamics discussed so far indicate that the DPA's dysfunctional afterlives inevitably limit the political terrain in which gender activism and advocacy operate. Despite these constraints women and feminist activists continue to mobilise for change. Interviews reveal two broad set of mobilisation strategies: some feminist activists and groups choose to focus their efforts at the grassroots level and inscribe activism within broader instances of civic mobilisation, while others work strategically to infiltrate and reform the existing consociational structures.
Since the end of the war, the informal space of grassroots activism has been crucial in providing an alternative bottom-up approach to addressing women's concerns and citizenship claims. 42 While the grassroots provide an important space for feminist politics, subverting and challenging the multi-layered structural constraints of institutional politics remains a huge challenge despite activists' efforts. A poignant example is the new course taken by the feminist organisation Crvena. From an initial focus on feminist art, culture and regional cooperation, in 2014 Crvena's interventions grew to encompass broader political demands enacted by the recent movements of popular protest, emerged in 2014. 43 During our conversation in 2015, Crvena activists explained that the waves of popular mobilisation held in 2014 ushered in a new political language and opportunities for radical action beyond the usual ethnonationalist narratives and disputes. 44 They viewed the protest movement as an unprecedented opening to inscribe feminist activism within larger concerns over the structural inequality and multilayered violence epitomised in the Dayton's mode of governance, as well as the commodification of feminism supported by international donors. Even though its more ambitious objectives were curtailed by the end of the plenums movement, the citizen-led experiment in radical politics provided an important, albeit, momentarily, opening to challenge the Dayton's status quo. 45 From a gender perspective, some activists suggest that the movement also created an opportunity to frame feminist concerns within larger solidarities. While these instances of radical politics were short-lived they remain significant as moments in which the dysfunctions of Dayton's afterlives were openly contested.
It is unfortunate that, rather than offering support for civic mobilisation, international actors such as the EU continued to privilege stability of the institutions negotiating a new compact for membership which, all rhetoric to the contrary, left many of Dayton's dysfunctions and elites' privileges unaddressed. 46 Other interviewees describe efforts to find openings for transformation, as small as these might be, within the existing consociational structures. Activists often present this strategy as a pragmatic, yet personally challenging, choice. For instance, a feminist activist whom I interviewed in 2010 illustrates this predicament when reflecting on the challenges and achievements for feminist activism in BiH:
This is my opinion: I think we have numerous obstacles. There's obstacles in human behaviour: in the perception of women, of gender. We have the challenge of a patriarchal society and then we have also another challenge of the country as it is, its legal division and its legal status. Despite these failures, the current NAP presents an interesting development which might yield opportunities for a fuller realisation of WPS goals. As mentioned earlier, a new element in the NAP lies in the inclusion of the broader concept of human security as an instrument that enables the localisation of the WPS agenda. 49 Through this mechanism a number of CSOs in cooperation with the BiH Agency for gender equality, and financial support from UN Women in BH and Fund for the Implementation of the Gender Action Plan in BiH (FIGAP) program, have implemented specific projects aiming to address the needs of women in local BiH communities. 50 An interviewee pointed out that the application of localised programmes in the Republika Srpska (RS) might offer opportunities to change the discriminatory legal provisions regulating the status of survivors. 51 It is premature to assess the outcome of this ongoing process. However, were the RS law regulating access to social rights eventually change, this could represent a significant victory for survivors' rights in Post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as an important step in integrating WPS into the consociational structures. Any mistakes I have made are my own.
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